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Taxes, Corruption, and Entry  
 
Abstract   Tax policies and corruption are important institutional considerations which can 
shape entrepreneurship. We investigate how tax rates, and the interaction between corruption and 
tax rates, influence variations in entry across a panel of 72 countries in the period 2005-2011. We 
use a series of panel estimations as well as several robustness checks to test these effects, using 
relevant controls for economic development, the size of the state, and other regulatory and tax 
policy measures. We find that higher tax rates consistently discourage entry. Further, we find 
that although the direct influence of corruption on entry is also consistently negative, the 
interaction influence of corruption and tax rate is positive. This indicates that corruption can 
offset the negative influence of high taxes on entry. We discuss the implications of our findings 
for policymakers and future research. 
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1 Introduction 
 
 “Over here, death, taxes and corruption are inevitable.” 
   -Comment on Tanzania, The East African newspaper, November 17, 2012 
 
 
Entrepreneurship can vary significantly across countries (Stenholm et al. 2013), as can 
the quality of regulatory institutions (Djankov et al. 2002; Audretsch and Lehmann 2005) 
including tax regulations. The question of how tax policy influences entrepreneurship outcomes 
is closely tied to the broader institutional context (see Bruce and Mohsin 2006) and economic 
conditions in a country (see Baliamourne-Lutz and Garello 2014; Bacher and Brülhart 2010; 
Parker 2003; OECD 2000). Tax policy is an important part of the environment which shapes how 
entrepreneurs could perceive future expected returns to their efforts (Baumol 1990). They can 
shape entrepreneurial decision-making and risk perceptions for entrepreneurs, constraining or 
encouraging them to take action. Tax policy could act as an exogenous barrier for entrepreneurs 
(van Stel et al. 2007) by, for example, taking away income which individuals could have used to 
support entry or business activities (Baliamoune-Lutz 2015), or could create a type of insurance 
buffer by shifting risk from the entrepreneur to the government (Gentry and Hubbard 2000). 
Considering tax policy across different country contexts also raises the question of 
corruption. There is growing consensus that corruption hurts entrepreneurs (Anokhin and 
Schulze 2009; Aidis et al. 2012; Acs et al. 2008), but its indirect influence on tax policy is a 
more complicated matter. Tax agents have discretion in enforcing tax law, which varies in 
complexity, adaptiveness, and enforceability across countries. The reality in many countries, 
especially many developing countries, is that the de jure policies simply do not match de facto 
activities (see Desai et al. 2013). Poorly developed or overly complex tax regulations in a 
country could lead to market failures, resulting from lack of contract enforcement (or 
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unreliable/inconsistent enforcement), expensive negotiation and compliance costs, inefficient 
search and information asymmetries (Estrin et al. 2006). Complying with de jure tax policy 
could be prohibitively costly in terms of time and money, and this could create incentives to seek 
other ways to comply. Complex tax policies could direct an entrepreneur to look for ways around 
them (see Web et al. 2009). Therefore, it is important to consider how entrepreneurship could be 
affected by unofficial ways to accomplish transactions, and whether corruption stimulates or 
discourages entrepreneurship (Kobrin 1978; Campos et .al. 2010; Dreher and Gassebner 2013). 
Recent research suggests institutions can interact with each other, and this should be investigated 
in further detail (see Aidis et al. 2012; Tonoyan et al. 2010). 
This study expands on current knowledge (e.g., Estrin et al., 2013; Djankov et al., 2010; 
Anokhin and Schulze 2009; Torini 2005) on taxes, corruption and entrepreneurship. Using a 
panel of 72 countries over the years 2005-2011, we test for direct and indirect effects in the 
interplay of tax policy, corruption, and entrepreneurship. We find that the tax rate and corruption 
directly discourage entry, and we also find that in some environments, corruption can foster entry 
by offsetting the negative direct effect of tax policy. 
We make three contributions to knowledge about the nexus of entrepreneurship, 
regulations, and corruption. First, we respond to calls for more nuanced analysis of how 
entrepreneurship is influenced by regulations (van Stel et al. 2007; Djankov et al. 2010; 
Stenholm et al. 2013), specifically tax policy (Da Rin et al. 2011; Henrekson et al. 2010) and 
corruption (Estrin et al. 2013; Aidis et al. 2012; Sobel 2008). In doing so, we advance 
entrepreneurship theory and empirical insights on “precisely which institutions are important” 
for entrepreneurship (Estrin et al. 2013). Second, our main empirical contribution lies in 
measuring the interplay between tax rates and corruption. In doing so, we provide some answers 
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to the long-standing question of whether corruption hurts or helps (Méon and Sekkat 2005; 
Djankov et al. 2002; Shleifer and Vishny 1993) entrepreneurship (Campos et al. 2010; Dreher 
and Gassebner 2013; Mahagaonkar 2008). Third, we test for direct and indirect influences of tax 
rate and corruption on entry. Our key findings are first that high taxes discourage entry and 
second, that corruption can offset the negative influence of high taxes on entry.  
The remainder of the paper is as follows. Next, we discuss our theoretical underpinnings 
and hypotheses. We present our data and method in section three and report our results in section 
four. We discuss our findings in section five, followed by a brief conclusion. 
 
2. Theoretical Background 
 
2.1 Tax policies and entrepreneurship 
 
Tax rates can shape how entrepreneurs anticipate expected returns to a potential new 
venture, by moving risk to (or from) the government. Domar and Musgrave (1944) argued that 
higher taxes actually shift risk from the entrepreneur to the government if the entrepreneur does 
not succeed, thereby offering insurance for entry (Gentry and Hubbard 2000: 284). Cullen and 
Gordon (2007) argued that taxes could affect entry through income shifting, risk subsidy, and 
risk sharing. In their perspective, the type of tax structure matters because small businesses can 
be taxed differently. For example, incorporated businesses in the United States are subject to 
corporate taxes and can deduct business-related expenses whereas self-employed/unincorporated 
businesses are taxed at the individual level. Thus depending on income level, tax policy could 
create a scenario where an individual receives a subsidy from the government, shaping risk and 
expected returns to entry. In this manner, tax policy could to some degree actually “compensate” 
for the risk of entry. On the other hand, tax policy could discourage entry because taxes can cut 
into income which otherwise could have been used by an individual to start a new firm or expand 
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an existing firm (Baliamoune-Lutz and Garello 2014), reducing the volume of financing 
available for entry. This could be especially salient for some types of entrepreneurs, like those 
aspiring to grow (Estrin et al. 2013) if taxes are progressive and lower expected gains from entry 
at higher levels. 
Empirical findings on the relationship between the tax rate and entrepreneurship1 have 
been mixed, at least in part because of heterogeneity in types of rates (e.g, marginal income tax, 
personal income tax, progressive tax), as well as different measures of entrepreneurship. Gentry 
and Hubbard (2004) found that progressive taxes influence individual risk-taking behavior even 
if someone is risk-neutral. However, Keuschnigg and Nielsen (2002) found that progressive tax 
has a negative impact on entrepreneurship and innovation, and Baliamoune-Lutz (2015) found 
progressive tax negatively influences both the established business ownership and nascent 
entrepreneurship in a panel of OECD countries. Cullen and Gordon (2007) found that allowing 
deductions for business losses on personal income tax returns raised entrepreneurial risk-taking 
by between 50-100%. Several studies on corporate tax rates support an adverse effect of higher 
corporate taxes on entrepreneurial activity (Djankov et al. 2010; Da Rin et al. 2011). Djankov et 
al. (2010) studied a range of tax policy measures in 85 countries and found that corporate taxes 
                                                          
1 Many studies, mostly pre mid-2000s, proxied entrepreneurship as self-employment (see Acs et al., 2014; Bruce, 
2002, 2000; Gentry and Hubbard, 2000; Parker, 1996). Some found a positive relationship between tax rate and self-
employment in developed countries. Evans and Leighton (1989a, b) and Blau (1987) studied the US context, and 
Bacher and Brülhart (2010) studied the Swiss context, both finding a positive relationship of tax progressivity and 
self-employment. However, some found negative, mixed or insignificant effects. A negative influence of marginal 
tax rate on self-employment was found for Canadian micro data (Stabile, 2004); similar findings emerged for the US 
and Canada (Schuetze, 2000) and the UK (Parker, 1996; Blanchflower and Oswald, 1990). For Sweden, Fölster 
(2002) and Davis and Henrekson (1999) found a negative relationship between tax rates and self-employment, and 
Hansson (2012) found a negative relationship for both marginal and average tax rates. Another set of studies found 
no significance for tax rate and self-employment (Baliamourne-Lutz and Garello, 2014; Bruce and Mohsin, 2006, 
Parker, 2003; OECD, 2000). Mixed findings of different measures are not unusual: Robson and Wren (1999) studied 
OECD countries and found a positive relationship of self-employment with average tax rate, but a negative 
relationship with marginal tax rate. The distinction between self-employment (labor market trend) versus entry (new 
firm formation) has emerged, e.g related to educational level (Blanchflower, 2004; Parker, 2009) or conditions of 
unemployment and necessity (Arum and Mueller, 2004). We do not examine self-employment in this study as we 
concerned with businesses most likely influenced by tax rates: new formal firms. For more on self-employment 
versus entrepreneurship, see Blanchflower (2004), Parker, (2009) and Arum and Mueller (2004). 
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negatively influence entrepreneurial activity reflected as business entry rate. Da Rin et al. (2011) 
examined the relationship between corporate income tax and formal entry and entrepreneurial 
activity in 17 European countries over the period 1997-2004, and also found a significant and 
negative role of corporate taxation. Gurley-Calvez and Bruce (2013), Fossen and Steiner (2009) 
and Carroll et al. (2001) found evidence of a negative relationship between marginal tax rates 
and entrepreneurship. In addition, a negative relationship between taxation and entry has been 
found under different market structures (Romer, 1994; Applebaum and Katz, 1996). As argued 
by Appelbaum and Katz (1996), incumbents have advantages over new entrants since they can 
use profits as buffer, which new entrants cannot. 
The structure of tax policy in a country can also affect tax morale, the “intrinsic 
motivation to pay taxes which arises from the moral obligation to pay taxes as a contribution to 
society” (Doerrenberg and Peichl, 2013: 295), and make tax evasion more attractive. If tax 
morale is low, tax compliance is also likely to be low. Torinni (2005) developed a model 
showing that tax evasion has a positive impact on self-employment, but the impact of the tax rate 
on self-employment depends on “country attitude toward tax evasion” (2005: 661).  
The tax rate is critically important because more income taken away by a higher tax rate should 
discourage businesses overall (Baliamoune-Lutz, 2015), but especially potential new firms. Knowledge 
about the tax rate can help a potential entrepreneur calculate likely profits, and can guide risk-taking 
which influences the actual entry decision. In this manner, tax policy could have a strong and basically 
immediate influence on entrepreneurship, because tax rates can be accessed ahead of time and calculated 
before the entry decision. We thus hypothesize  
HI: Higher tax rates will discourage entry. 
 
 
2.3 Tax policy, corruption, and entrepreneurship 
 
7 
 
Corruption is the use of public office or authority for personal benefit (Rodriguez et al., 
2006) and could reflect an inefficient or overregulated environment (Djankov et al., 2002) and/or 
ineffective political systems and national governments (Weston and Sorge, 1972).  
While corruption is an important challenge for economic growth (see Kaufman and Kraay 
2006; Méon and Sekkat, 2005), the many nuanced effects of corruption are difficult to capture. 
This could be because possible “intermediary” effects of corruption through other economic 
dynamics, like entry or firm dynamics related to innovation (Mahagaonkar, 2008), are hard to 
pick up, but, in turn, impact growth (Dreher and Gassebner, 2013). 
It is well-accepted that corruption can become embedded (see Aidis et al., 2012; Estrin et al., 
2013) in the de facto business environment in a country. This can happen in the tax system quite 
easily for at least two reasons: Tax morale, and a race to the bottom. First, corruption can create 
a vicious circle with the tax morale of individual entrepreneurs by generating mistrust in the 
government, solidifying incentives for corruption. In a highly corrupt environment, tax morale 
might be low and individuals may not trust that government will appropriately administer taxes 
for public services. This mistrust in government can make tax evasion more appealing. 
Second, corruption in the tax regime can inspire a “race to the bottom” because it can change 
the cost structure of firms since it enables the entrepreneur to hide some or even all income. The 
entrepreneur can hide income by paying officials to overlook their actual income by allowing 
them to overstate deductions, underreport income, or not file tax returns at all. Cullen and 
Gordon (2007) note that small businesses can easily underreport taxable receipts. Corruption 
could provide another route for firms to avoid high tax rates. For example, the ability to bribe 
could mean firms simply pay less corporate tax or can negotiate unsanctioned agreements with 
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government agents for lower tax payments2. Partial or complete tax evasion is problematic 
because it allows an individual firm to temporarily lower its costs, giving it an unfair advantage 
over its competitors. The funds not paid in taxes can then be used for other purposes, including 
investment. Competing firms, in the next tax cycle, can either adhere to the policies or pay bribes 
in order to lower their own costs. This pressure is greater on potential entrepreneurs or new firms 
because they tend to have fewer resources to cope (see Tonoyan et al. 2010). 
Tax policy and corruption are important institutional considerations for entry (see Djankov et 
al. 2002, 2010), and their relationship has implications for public revenues as well. Complicated 
tax regulations can create greater opportunities for bureaucrats to seek bribes. In particular, high 
tax rates directly relate to an increase in the likelihood of corruption, as government officials 
offer to facilitate transactions (Méon and Sekkat 2005). Bureaucrats may be motivated to seek 
bribes to exploit and take advantage of entrepreneurs, or they may take bribes in order to help 
entrepreneurs navigate a problematic regulatory system. Corruption can thus either have the 
effect of a grabbing hand or helping hand (Méon and Sekkat 2005; Shleifer and Vishny 1994, 
2002). Regardless of motivation, complicated tax regulations can open the door for bureaucrats 
to seek bribes. In many developing countries, the government sector dominates (Tanzi and 
Davoodi, 2000) and public intervention in all spheres of public life is pervasive (Tanzi and 
Davoodi, 2000), so street level bureaucrats have ample opportunity to use discretion in applying 
tax policy. Inadequately specified rules or even contradictory policies can give bureaucrats 
significant discretionary powers to hurt or help entrepreneurs navigate tax policies.  
                                                          
2 Value-added tax (VAT) is another tax policy tool which could enhance the desirability of corruption. Although 
many countries have adopted VAT, individuals might not register their business to lower tax liability, or register but 
submit personal expense invoices as business expense (Alm 2012, Gordon and Li 2009). Another strategy could be 
to buy or sell from firms owned by the same individual, within a country or overseas. 
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The grabbing effect occurs if bureaucrats are able to exploit entrepreneurs too much, e.g, 
multiple requests for bribes or overly high amounts or holding up transactions to force bribing. 
Poor enforcement of regulations is more problematic in developing countries, marked by less 
oversight of regulators and less formalized business customs (Braithwaite 2006). Higher 
transaction costs imposed by corruption could put an extra burden on entrepreneurs (Coase 1960) 
and impact perceptions about “the portion of the value that ventures create that the entrepreneur 
is able to capture for their own purposes” (Baker et al. 2005: 497). Corruption in this way takes a 
portion of the profits expected from entry, but given its innate hidden nature, the amount and 
frequency of bribing could itself also be unpredictable: In this way, corruption could increase 
uncertainty and discourage entry. To avoid exploitation by public agents, an individual might 
avoid entry completely (Aidis et al. 2012). Support for the grabbing nature of corruption on 
entrepreneurship has been found in 20 emerging and developing economies, where elites exert 
significant power (Tonoyan et al. 2010), and among small firms with fewer than 10 employees in 
municipalities in Brazil (Bologna and Ross 2015). Similarly, more effective control of corruption 
was found to positively influence entrepreneurship in 64 countries (Anokhin and Schulze 2009). 
On the other hand, the helping effect occurs if efficient corruption allows entrepreneurs to get 
things done by bribing. Supporters of efficient corruption argue that corruption can grease the 
wheels of regulatory systems which are antiquated or inefficient, and can allow for greater 
efficiency in the allocation of constrained resources. Meon and Sekkat (2005) suggest corruption 
increases the rate at which bureaucrats issue permits, thereby speeding up the process. Therefore, 
individuals who are willing to pay bribes can enter the market and accomplish regulatory 
requirements more easily. Shleifer and Vishny (1993) note that efficient corruption could be 
effective if the bribe is well-defined and expected (predictable). In this way, corruption could 
10 
 
reduce uncertainty. Efficient corruption may allow entrepreneurs to pay less tax or entirely evade 
taxes in exchange for bribes. Entrepreneurs with personal connection/ties with bureaucrats and 
can bribe to their advantage (Pathak et al. 2015). Given this, corruption could be favorable to the 
entrepreneur by improving the “speed of money” if tax policy is particularly burdensome but 
could hurt if tax policy burden is low. For this reason, we hypothesize: 
H2a: High corruption will offset a decline in the entry at higher tax rates. 
 
3 Data and methodology  
 
3.1 Data and Sample 
 
We constructed our cross-sectional panel sample by matching data from the following 
sources at the country level: World Bank Group Entrepreneurship Snapshot (2005-2011), World 
Development Indicators (2005-2011), Doing Business Database (2005-2011), World Governance 
Indicators (WGI) (2005-2011) and Transparency International (2005-2011). 
Missing data for many countries restricted our sample. We consider the inclusion of a larger 
sample of developing countries an important tradeoff in order to study variance around the world 
(Thai and Turkina 2014) and still manage to achieve a sample size large enough for the empirical 
analysis. Ultimately, our final dataset covers 72 countries over the period 2005-20113 with 307 
observations. This is on average 4.2 years of observation for each country from 2005-2011. 
Variables are described in Table 1. Descriptive statistics and correlations are reported in Table 2.  
- INSERT TABLES 1 AND 2 HERE - 
 
                                                          
3 Two things are noteworthy about our time period, 2005-2011, which was restricted by data availability. First, 
results could be affected by the global recession, which occurred during this period. We accept this as a limitation 
which can be illuminated in future research as data availability improves. Second, as we detail in our discussion of 
the dependent variable, we use formal entry density to measure entrepreneurship. This standardized measure counts 
limited liability companies in a country using a well-defined process, so our measure captures registered firms which 
we infer to have been able to pay registration costs (and therefore will comply with tax and other regulations in the 
future), and are likely to have more financial resources than the self-employed or other entrepreneurs who act 
because they lack other opportunities (necessity-entrepreneurship). This strict adherence to a specific and “higher” 
level of entrepreneurship, to some degree, protects our results from being affected drastically by the recession.  
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3.2 Dependent variable 
 
We measure entry as formal entry density is taken in logarithm, calculated as the number of 
new limited liability companies (LLCs) established per 1,000 people in a country. Creating a 
logarithm of our dependent variable ensures a normal distribution of the variable, as opposed to 
using the entry rate in levels. This measure comes from the World Bank Group Entrepreneurship 
Snapshot for the years 2005-2011.  
Selecting any measure of entrepreneurship necessitates tradeoffs between overestimation 
using an overly generous definition, or underestimation using an overly restrictive definition. 
Our approach, given the time period for which data is available, is to be more restrictive in our 
definition in order to ensure a comparable measure which captures the same dynamic across 
countries, and which reflects a certain level (“quality”) of entrepreneurial activity which is likely 
to be affected by formal regulation and which may be more insulated against the financial crisis 
than other measures. We, therefore, consider the selection of the World Bank’s formal entry 
density more appropriate than other measures, such as self-employment and necessity 
entrepreneurship or similar measures, because it captures new formal firms, which logically 
would be more sensitive to tax regulations, and more appropriate measure of entrepreneurship. 
Our entrepreneurship measure is not per se superior to other measures of entrepreneurship, but as 
with Djankov et al. (2010), we feel it is the appropriate tradeoff for our purposes (see Acs et al., 
2008 for more). Overall, developing countries are likely to have a less formal entry (country 
fixed effects capture change over the panel period, as noted later).  
3.3. Independent variables 
 
Our main measure of interest for tax policy is the corporate tax rate, capturing the direct 
financial burden imposed by tax policy. It is defined as the percentage of commercial profits paid 
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by businesses (Djankov et al., 2002; Kaufmann et al., 2006), and taken from the Doing Business 
database (see Dreher and Gassebner, 2013). The tax rate is taken in levels for linear models.  
Our measure of corruption is the extent to which corruption is controlled in the country. We 
collected this from sources for comparative cross-country data on corruption used in previous 
research: World Governance Indicators (see Anokhin and Schulze, 2009; Kaufmann et al. 2006; 
Cuervo-Cazurra, 2006) and Corruption Perceptions Index (see Tonoyan et al., 2010). 
 World Governance Indicators (WGI): The WGI corruption measure reflects the extent to 
which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of 
corruption, as well as “capture” of the state by elites and private interests (Kaufmann, et 
al. 2006). Country scores range from -2.5 (high corruption) to 2.5 (low corruption). We 
reversed the measure by multiplying by -1 so that 2.5 corresponds to high corruption and 
-2.5 corresponds to low corruption.  
 Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) from Transparency International:  This measure 
captures how corrupt is the public sector of a specific country from 2005-2011. The score 
ranges from 0 to 10, where 10 reflects low corruption level in the public sector.  We 
reverse this index so that 10 reflects high corruption and 0 reflects low corruption. 
Both corruption measures are used in levels in the linear and non-linear models in our 
analysis. Higher scores on these measures reflect higher corruption and lower scores reflect 
lower corruption (Aidis et al. 2012; McMullen et al. 2008).  
 
3.4 Control Variables 
We control for two other measures related to tax regulations – procedures, measured as the 
frequency of tax payments, and time, measured as the number of hours needed to prepare and 
pay taxes (see van Stel et al. 2007; Djankov et al. 2002, 2010). We do this because bureaucratic 
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procedures could lengthen the time and complexity (see Dreher and Gassebner 2013) to 
complete a transaction. This could also hinder entry by raising costs, discouraging an 
entrepreneur who might have to spend more resources, time, effort, etc. Both of these measures 
are taken from the Doing Business dataset.  
We also control for other dimensions of the regulatory environment more broadly, using 
insolvency cost, measured as the cost to close a business (Klapper et al., 2006; Acs et al., 2008), 
and taken from the Doing Business database. We use public registration bureau to measure the 
effectiveness of the credit and broader financial system, taken from the Doing Business database 
(Baliamoune-Lutz, 2015). The index ranges from 0 to 6, with a high score corresponding to the 
strong depth of credit information. 
We also account for the impact of a country’s economic status on entrepreneurship over time 
(Carree et al., 2002; Parker 2009; Estrin et al., 2013; Stenholm et al., 2013) and the varied levels 
of socioeconomic and institutional development among countries in our sample. There could be 
differences in how high-income and low-income countries rely on sources for tax revenues, like 
corporate tax versus personal income tax (Gordon and Li, 2009). We control for economic 
development using GDP per capita, taken from World Development Indicators (Estrin et al. 
2013; Aidis et al. 2012). In line with previous research approaches (Estrin et al., 2013; Carree et 
al., 2002) tying lower and higher levels of economic development, we use GDP per capita 
categorized into four quantiles, so we apply three dummies (instead of continuous GDP per 
capita) and omit the lowest quantile. All higher quantiles of GDP per capita are compared with 
the first one which is omitted.  
We control for human capital in the country, measured as a percentage of population 
enrolled in tertiary education (Fritsch and Schroeter 2011). 
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We also need to consider the size of government. Tax policy could be driven by disincentive 
effects on entry, which could happen when there are a large state sector and employment choices 
(Henrekson et al. 2010; Aidis et al. 2012). If so, being an entrepreneur could be less attractive 
since benefits for employees are high. Extensive welfare support could undermine incentives for 
individual savings, which can how potential entrepreneurs save and especially high-growth 
entrepreneurs (Korosteleva and Mickiewicz 2011). Also, greater government activity could 
crowd out entrepreneurs (Aidis et al. 2012). We thus include the size of the state, measured as 
general government final consumption expenditure, to control for this possible disincentive4. 
This proxy includes take from the World Development Indicators and includes all government 
current expenditures for the purchase of goods and services, including compensation of 
employees. It also includes most expenditures on national defense and security but excludes 
government military expenditures which are part of government capital formation. 
Finally, we include time fixed effects because of changes in the world financial system (e.g. 
crises, macroeconomic shocks), which occurred within the period 2005-2011 and affected all 
countries. Finally, we include country fixed effects to account for differences in culture, 
aspirations, capacity, and other country-specific factors. 
3.4 Empirical strategy  
 
No multicollinearity was detected except the corruption measures, which are highly 
correlated with a coefficient 0.88 – 0.92. These coefficients present correlations between WGI 
and CPI. This high correlation suggests that the corruption measures are interrelated and the 
results based on any of the measures are applicable when designing tax and entrepreneurship 
policy. Our empirical analysis is divided into two steps: (1) a log-linear basic panel data model 
with country fixed effects including variables related to tax rates (H1) and corruption and tax 
                                                          
4 We are grateful to one of the reviewers of this paper for this suggestion. 
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rates (H2) and controls, including time and country dummies; (2) a log-linear basic panel data 
model with country fixed effects using interaction analysis while examining the conditional 
effect of corruption in a relationship between tax rate and entry. The model enables us to 
interpret changes, in percent, in a tax policy measure and the association with changes, in 
percent, with entrepreneurial entry. For robustness, we use both the WGI and CPI measures of 
corruption. We also add government final consumption expenditure as a proxy for the size of the 
state, to control jointly for possible disincentive effects of taxation. With this in mind, we 
develop a robust empirical model for the determinants of entry, as the following log-linear  
estimations in a panel of 72 countries for seven years: 
 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 =  𝑓(𝛽𝑥𝑖𝑡 , Ɵ𝑧𝑖𝑡, 𝜏 ∗ 𝜃, 𝛼, µ𝑖𝑡)  , i=1,..., N;    t=1,...,T   (1) 
 
where yit is new business registry per 1000 people in a given country i at time t taken in 
logarithms; β are parameters of the variables of interest related to our main hypothesis to be 
estimated and Ɵ are parameters of the control variables; xit is a vector of independent 
explanatory variables and zit is a vector of strictly exogenous control variables (taken in logs in 
log-log models); 𝜏 ∗ 𝜃 an interaction term of corruption and a type of tax policy. Alpha 
coefficient in the equation controls for time-fixed effects and uit for country-specific effects. 
Regional and country heterogeneity of institutions is important to consider (Acs et. al., 2014; 
Belitski and Desai 2015). By including country-specific fixed effects, using country dummies, 
we are controlling for the time-invariant part of unobserved heterogeneity in countries. Year 
dummies are also included in all models to capture unobserved time-specific effects. Standard 
errors are clustered by country, allowing for inter-temporal correlation of regressors within the 
same country over time. 
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Controlling for country fixed effects, we first deal with endogeneity related to an omitted 
variable bias from unobserved country characteristics. Country dummies, if not included and the 
factors that they attempt to account for, will be placed within the idiosyncratic error term and 
may be correlated with other macroeconomic characteristics, institutions and tax policy variables 
in the equation. Endogeneity bias is correlated with a model which used country dummies as 
fixed effects.  
In addition, one may argue that the time period is short for panel estimation. However, 
reverse causality is an obvious danger when corruption, entrepreneurship, and tax policy are 
concerned. One way to deal with reverse causality is to include lagged values of independent 
variables and institutional variables. Our particular concern is economic growth, which is co-
determined with entry, as well as insolvency cost, the size of the state and tax financial and 
administrative regulation, which may be co-determined with the entrepreneurial outcomes in a 
country. For example, the demand for corruption could come from entrepreneurs who actively 
seek to grease the wheels (Mahagaonkar 2008), or it could be argued that lobbying from the 
business sector could affect how tax policy responds to a change in entry and market health. We 
use one-year lags for our explanatory and control variables; our final sample size is 307 
observations with 72 countries. The lagged variables (including the interaction terms) enable us 
to resolve possible reverse causality. Institutional framework in a country could shape 
entrepreneurial perceptions and decisions in the future (Estrin et al. 2013), but this can take time. 
Confidence in the unbiased results in regard to endogeneity is achieved by controlling for 
country-fixed effects (omitted variable bias) and using lags. Various alternative specifications 
without lags were used but provided similar statistical significance. We used the lagged model 
for our final results with numerous robustness checks, using two proxies for corruption, various 
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model specifications with and without insolvency cost, public registration bureau, size of the 
state to identify possible bias and make the results more robust and intuitively interpretable. 
 
4. Results 
4.1 Panel regression model (Table 3)  
 
The results of the linear regression model are reported in Table 3. Specification 1 includes 
tax corruption (using the WGI measure) and all control variables with time and country 
dummies. Specification 2 uses the full model with all tax policy measures for financial 
(corporate tax rate) and administrative (frequency of tax payments, time to pay taxes) costs. 
Specifications 3 and 4 introduce the interaction analysis of tax rate, conditional on corruption, 
and controlling for procedural tax burden (time and procedures to pay taxes). Specification 5 also 
tests our null hypothesis by excluding public registration bureau and insolvency cost, which may 
pick up some of the effects of economic development on entry. Specification 5-7 is a robustness 
check to see results which exclude public registration bureau and insolvency cost, but keeps in 
economic development and adds the size of the state.  
Results for our control variables are interesting. Our controls for procedural tax policies, the 
frequency of tax payments and time to pay taxes (specifications 2, 4-7) are not significant across 
specifications. Our other controls for non-tax regulations, public registration bureau, and 
insolvency cost are also not significant across specifications. 
Human capital is positive and significant with entrepreneurship (β=0.04; p<0.01), consistent 
with previous research (Audretsch and Feldman 1996; Fritsch and Schroeter, 2011; Audretsch 
and Belitski, 2013). The magnitude of this relationship is not large: A 1 percent increase in 
tertiary education enrollment (ICSED 5 and 6) in the population is associated with 0.04 percent 
increase in entry density. The size of the state, in specifications 6 and 7, is negative as expected 
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(Estrin et al. 2013; Stenholm et al. 2013; Acs et al. 2008) but not statistically significant even at 
the 10% level (β=-0.01; p<0.20).  
Countries with higher than average economic development (3rd quantile) have lower entry 
than those with lower level of economic development, in particular in the first quantile (β=0.82; 
p<0.05); lower economic development corresponds with on average 0.82 percent more entry 
density per 1,000 residents, a finding in line with previous research (Carree et al. 2002; Parker 
2009). It is worth also noting our robustness checks to see if some regulatory controls might be 
picking up economic development effects and if the size of state could have disincentive effects. 
In specification 5, we exclude public registration bureau and insolvency cost but we include 
economic development in quartiles. In specification 6, we add the control for the size of the state. 
We run the full model in specification 7. We find results for economic development do not 
change. 
Corruption in all specifications in Table 3 demonstrates a negative association with 
entrepreneurship, varying from -1.04 to -1.24 at 1% statistical significance, consistent with 
previous research (Djankov et al. 2002; Henrekson et al. 2010; Tonoyan et al. 2010; Aidis et al. 
2012; Estrin et. al. 2013). This means that a one unit change in corruption, proxied using the 
WGI measure and varying from negative 2.5 to positive 1.92 in our sample, is associated with a 
shift in entry density from 104 to 124 percent. In other words, entry is highly responsive to 
corruption (Djankov et al., 2002; Aidis et al., 2012).  
We now turn to the influence of tax policy on entry. In specifications 2-7, we find a negative 
association between corporate tax rate and entry (β= from -0.01 to -0.03; p<0.01). An increase of 
the corporate tax by one percent is associated with a decrease in entry density by 2 percent (β=-
0.02; p<0.01). This supports H1, which predicted that higher tax rates discourage entry. 
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We now examine how tax rate influences entry under conditions of high and low corruption 
by including the interaction term corruption*tax rate. In specification 3, we see the coefficients 
remain negative for corporate tax rate (β= -0.02; p<0.05) and corruption (β= -1.44; p<0.05), 
while the interaction term shows the conditional effect of corruption on the relationship between 
tax rate and entry is positive and statistically significant (β= 0.01; p<0.05), supporting H1. This 
effect is similarly observed in specifications 5-7 in the robustness checks in table 4 (β= 0.01; 
p<0.05). This suggests corruption could mitigate higher tax rates in the direction of a helping 
effect (Méon and Sekkat 2005; Mahagaonkar 2008), with coefficients being positive. In 
specifications 3-7 (Table 3) a unit change in corruption offsets 1 percent of a decrease in entry 
density while the tax rate increases by one percent (β= 0.01; p<0.05). In other words, though tax 
rate deters entry density by 2%, the interaction term representing corruption*tax rate 
compensates this fall by 1%. This is a net interaction effect of corruption on the relationship 
between tax rate and entry. 
 
4.2. Panel regression model - robustness (Table 4)  
 
The results of the estimations in Table 3 clearly demonstrate the direct influence of tax rate 
and corruption on entry, but also assumed a relationship to be conditional on corruption. This 
condition calls for further consideration that the marginal impact of the tax rate on entry could 
differ at different levels (see Klapper and Love, 2010). Also, it could be the case that a single 
measure of corruption could be biased or correlated with the error term of the estimations in 
Table 3. We, therefore, run a full set of robustness checks for a set of models similar to ones 
estimated in Table 3 using a different measure of corruption - the Corruption Perceptions Index 
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(CPI) from Transparency International5. We run our log-linear models in specifications 1-7, 
reported in Table 4. Overall, we find empirical support consistent with our results in the main 
specifications in Table 3, which used the WGI measure for corruption. 
Results for controls are similar. Similar to findings in Table 3, frequency of tax payments, 
time to pay taxes, public registration bureau, and insolvency costs are all not significant. As with 
the main estimations, human capital is positive and significant with entry, and size of the state is 
not significant. Our control for economic development is also similar to the main estimations, 
with average economic development (3rd quantile) associated with less entry. We ran checks in 
Table 4, analogously to those for economic development effects and size of state disincentive 
effects in Table 3. In specification 5, we excluded public registration bureau and insolvency cost. 
We added the size of the state in specification 6 and ran the full model in specification 7. Our 
findings are consistent overall.  
Corruption is found to be negative and significant for entry, with the partial regression 
coefficient changing (β= from -0.38 to -0.58; p<0.01). Results show that a one unit increase of 
corruption, proxied by the CPI which varies from zero to 10 in our sample, discourages entry 
density by 38-58 percent. Although results in the robustness checks (Table 4) are lower than the 
main estimations (Table 3), the difference in the estimated coefficients demonstrating the impact 
of corruption on entry is not statistically significant between Tables 3 and 4. 
As with the main findings, the tax rate is negatively associated with the entry (β= from -0.01 
to -0.10; p<0.01) in the log-linear models (specifications 1-7). We find that a 1% increase in the 
tax rate leads to a decline in entry density between 1 to 5 percent.  
                                                          
5 We also conducted a set of checks using a third measure of corruption from the Heritage Foundation’s Index of 
Economic Freedom. This measure is derived in part with Transparency International (TI), and is correlated with the 
CPI measure (+92), so we do not report it here and consider the use of CPI adequate for our purposes. 
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Finally, when we add the interaction term corruption*tax rate, we find the conditional effect 
of corruption on the relationship between the tax rate and entry (specifications 1-4) is positive 
and significant, with the coefficient ranging between 0.01 and 0.005 (p<0.05). This indicates that 
a 1% change in corporate tax rate while an increase of one unit in corruption (0 to 10 scale) 
offsets decrease in entry density by 0.5-1 percent  
 
5 Discussion 
 
Both our main results (Table 3) and the robustness checks using another measure of 
corruption (Table 4) demonstrated a significant negative and direct influence of tax rate on entry. 
This finding is straightforward and consistent with previous research (Djankov et al., 2002, 
2010). Interestingly, we find no significant relationship for entry when we use our controls for 
other tools of tax policy - the number of tax payments and time required to pay taxes. These 
findings, when taken together, indicate the direct financial costs imposed by the tax rate (Estrin 
et al. 2006, 2013) have a pronounced effect on entry, unlike procedural or bureaucratic costs 
related to tax policy. This suggests policymakers should prioritize the tax rate for policy reforms, 
and less so the procedural dimensions of tax policy, such as the number of forms or the amount 
of time needed to file the forms. However, we advise caution when interpreting these findings, 
because this is not to say the number of tax payments is unimportant. Procedures Further 
research should more deeply investigate how different measures and tools within the tax policy 
regime influence entry, and further. Our findings make a strong argument for future research to 
treat the tax (see Estrin et al. 2006, 2013) as well as other dimensions within the regulatory 
environment themselves as multi-dimensional (Audretsch et al. 2015; Belitski and Desai 2015; 
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Klapper and Love, 2010), and to explore multiple tools and measures of a specific institutional 
dimension (e.g, tax policy, export regulation, entry regulation). 
We find the direct influence of corruption to be negative and significant for entry, which is 
not surprising given previous research (Djankov et al. 2002; Henrekson et al. 2010; Tonoyan et 
al. 2010; Aidis et al. 2012; Estrin et. al. 2013). We also find the interaction influence of 
corruption and tax rate to be positive and significant on entry. This means that changes in tax rate 
and willing to pay bribes influences the impact of the tax rate on entry. In other words, we find 
that entry is harmed when tax rates are high, but this effect could be offset with corruption. For 
countries with high taxes and high corruption, our findings indicate that policymakers would be 
well-advised to optimize the corporate tax rate concurrently with fighting corruption, which itself 
acts as a type of tax. In addition, policymakers should be concerned about the “attractiveness” of 
paying bribes to offset high tax rates. 
It is also worth mentioning that we ran several robustness checks related to credit registration 
bureau, insolvency costs, the size of the state, and economic development. These indicated that 
the effect of tax rate does not come from a disincentive effect and a large state sector and welfare 
policy (Henrekson et al. 2010; Korosteleva and Mickiewicz 2011; Aidis et al. 2012).  
Our findings underscore the need for policymakers to continue to fight corruption, and 
further, for researchers to pay special attention to the indirect effects of corruption on different 
regulatory dimensions. Future research could both deepen and widen the implications related to 
our findings. As policymakers often use fiscal policy tools to support entrepreneurship 
(Audretsch and Feldman 1996; Acs et al. 2009), it would be productive for future research to 
more deeply investigate. In addition, future research could widen the scope of knowledge of 
regulations, corruption and entry by considering other regulatory institutions (e.g, related to 
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property registration, contract enforcement, export, entry regulation, etc) and how these might 
interact with corruption at different levels of economic development to influence entry. Finally, 
future research could use our approach to examine how tax policy and corruption, and other 
types of regulation, drive other entrepreneurial activities, such as informal entrepreneurship, 
high-growth entrepreneurship, export-oriented entrepreneurship, etc. 
6  Conclusion 
 
In this paper, we examined the influence of corporate tax rates on entry as well as the 
interaction effect of corruption with the corporate tax rate on entry, on a panel of 72 countries in 
the period 2005-2011. Using a robust empirical strategy comprising panel data analysis and a set 
of robustness checks, we provide new insight into the direct and indirect influence of tax rate and 
corruption on entry. Our main findings are first that higher tax rates discourage entry, and 
second, that corruption can help offset this effect when tax rates are high.  
We contribute to a growing research agenda on the national regulatory and institutional 
environment for entrepreneurship (e.g., Klapper et al. 2006; Acs et al. 2008; Estrin et al. 2013; 
Stenholm et al. 2013) and specifically taxes and entrepreneurship (e.g., Da Rin et al. 2011; 
Henrekson et al. 2010; Djankov et al. 2002, 2010) and corruption and entrepreneurship (e.g., 
Chowdhury et al. 2015; Mahagaonker 2008). We extend previous research (Carree et al. 2002; 
van Stel et al. 2007; Campos et .al. 2010; Aidis et al., 2012; Dreher and Gassebner 2013) on the 
complex relationship of corruption and entry, and clearly demonstrate that corruption can 
facilitate entry (Méon and Sekkat 2005) by offsetting high taxes. 
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TABLE 1: Variables and sources (2005-2011) 
Variable name Variable description Source 
Entry(ln) The number of newly registered corporations per 1,000 
working-age people (those age 15-64) in logarithms. 
World Bank Group 
Entrepreneurship 
Survey 
Economic 
Development 
GDP per capita (constant LCU)  World Development 
indicator (2005-2011) 
Public 
registration 
bureau 
Individuals and firms listed by a private credit bureau 
with information on their borrowing history from the 
past 5 years (% of population). 
Doing Business Data 
Insolvency  cost The cost of the proceedings is recorded as a percentage 
of the estate’s value. 
Doing Business Data 
Human Capital Total is the total enrollment in tertiary education 
(ISCED 5 and 6), regardless of age, expressed as a 
percentage of the total population of the five-year age 
group following on from secondary school leaving (% 
gross).  
UNESCO Institute for 
Statistics 
Corruption 
(WGI) 
Perceptions of the extent to which public power is 
exercised for private gain, including both petty and 
grand forms of corruption, as well as “capture” of the 
state by elites and private interests. The score ranges 
from -2.5 to 2.5. We reversed the order by multiplying 
by -1(2.5=most corrupt, -2.5=least corrupt).   
Kaufmann, et al. 2009 
Corruption (CPI) The Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) ranks countries 
in terms of the degree to which corruption is perceived 
to exist in the misuse of public power for private 
benefit. Index units, 10=most corrupt, 0=least corrupt 
(after we reversed order) 
Transparency 
International 
Corruption (IEF) The index is primarily derived from CPI. The score 
ranges from 0 to 100. 100=most corrupt, 0= least 
corrupt (after we reversed order). 
Heritage Foundation 
Corporate Tax The amount of taxes on profits paid by the business as a 
percentage of commercial profits. 
Doing Business Data 
Frequency of tax 
payments 
The total number of tax payments per year, the 
frequency of payment. 
Doing Business Data 
Time to pay taxes Time to prepare and pay taxes (hours) Doing Business Data 
Size of State General government final consumption expenditure (% 
of GDP) 
WB - World 
Governance Indicators 
(2005-2011) 
Source: World Bank Group Entrepreneurship Snapshot (2005; 2011), World Development Indicators (2005-2011), 
Doing Business Database (2005-2011), and World Governance Indicators (2005-2011).
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix 
 Mean St 
dev 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1. Entry(ln) -0.13 1.7 1           
2. GDP per capita 10.42 2.33 -0.10 1          
3. Public registration 
bureau 
6.20 11.53 0.20* -0.11 1         
4. Insolvency cost 15.29 9.52 -0.11 0.11* -0.18* 1        
5. Human capital 32.48 21.88 0.57* -0.06 0.23* -0.03 1       
6. Corruption (CPI) 6.52 1.34 -0.52* -0.01 -0.18* 0.12* -0.25* 1      
7. Corruption (IEF) 65.78 13.3 -0.53* 0.001 -0.24* 0.17* -0.28* 0.92* 1     
8. Corruption (WGI) 0.30 0.63 -0.56* -0.04 -0.18* 0.05 -0.22* 0.92* 0.88* 1    
9. Corporate Tax  47.11 25.95 -0.22* 0.07 -0.05 -0.01 0.16* 0.30* 0.26* 0.31* 1   
10. Frequency of tax 
payments 
39.2 28.16 -0.13* 0.02 -0.15* 0.22* 0.13* 0.33* 0.31* 0.31* 0.31* 1  
11. Time to pay taxes 347.7 254.1 -0.10 -0.01 -0.04 0.23* 0.22* 0.31* 0.29* 0.29* 0.26* 0.51* 1 
12. Size of state 72.26 17.11 0.32* 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.42* 0.17* 0.22* 0.22* -0.03 0.13* -0.11* 
Note: Number of obs.: 307. *level of significance is 5%. 
Source: World Bank Group Entrepreneurship Snapshot (2005; 2011), World Development Indicators (2005-2011), Doing Business Database (2005-2011), and 
World Governance Indicators (2005-2011). 
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Table 3: Regression results for linear models (log-linear): DV - Entry (ln) 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
GDP per capita 2nd quantile  
-0.34 
(0.37) 
-0.19 
(0.36) 
-0.18 
(0.35) 
-0.18 
(0.36) 
-0.22 
(0.35) 
-0.21 
(0.34) 
-0.16 
(0.35) 
GDP per capita 3rd quantile 
-0.88* 
(0.46) 
-0.86** 
(0.40) 
-0.79** 
(0.40) 
-0.82** 
(0.40) 
-0.84** 
(0.40) 
-0.82** 
(0.40) 
-0.79** 
(0.39) 
GDP per capita 4th quantile 
-0.37 
(0.33) 
-0.26 
(0.32) 
-0.18 
(0.33) 
-0.18 
(0.33) 
-0.22 
(0.29) 
-0.22 
(0.30) 
-0.17 
(0.34) 
Size of state      
-0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
Public credit bureau 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.01)   
0.01 
(0.01) 
Insolvency cost 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.01)   
-0.01 
(0.01) 
Human capital 
0.03*** 
(0.01) 
0.03*** 
(0.01) 
0.04*** 
(0.01) 
0.03*** 
(0.01) 
0.03*** 
(0.01) 
0.03*** 
(0.01) 
0.03*** 
(0.01) 
Corruption (WGI) 
-1.24*** 
(0.19) 
-1.04*** 
(0.21) 
-1.44*** 
(0.24) 
-1.41*** 
(0.25) 
-1. 34*** 
(0.25) 
-1.41*** 
(0.25) 
-1.43*** 
(0.24) 
Financial tax policy (tax rate) 
 
-0.02** 
(0.00) 
-0.02*** 
(0.01) 
-0.02*** 
(0.01) 
-0.02*** 
(0.01) 
-0.02*** 
(0.01) 
-0.02*** 
(0.01) 
Administrative tax policy 
(frequency of tax payments)  
0.001 
(0.00)  
0.001 
(0.00) 
0.001 
(0.00) 
0.001 
(0.00) 
0.001 
(0.00) 
Administrative tax policy 
(time to pay taxes)  
-0.003 
(0.00)  
-0.003 
(0.00) 
-0.003 
(0.00) 
-0.003 
(0.00) 
-0.003 
(0.00) 
Corruption (WGI)  x Financial 
tax policy (tax rate) 
 
 
 
 
0.01** 
(0.01) 
0.01** 
(0.01) 
0.01** 
(0.01) 
 
0.01** 
(0.01) 
0.01** 
(0.01) 
Constant 
-0.06 
(0.56) 
0.21 
(0.53) 
0.29 
(0.54) 
0.27 
(0.55) 
-0.14 
(0.55) 
0.48 
(0.82) 
0.59 
(0.82) 
R2 .56 .59 .60 .60 .60 .60 .60 
RMSE 1.18 1.15 1.13 1.13 1.13 1.13 1.13 
F stat 9.75 8.28 9.63 8.84 9.31 10.91 9.57 
Year & country controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Note: Number of obs.: 307. Number of countries: 72. Level of statistical significance is * 0.10%; ** 0.05%. and *** 
0.01%. Standard errors are in parenthesis and are robust for heteroskedasticity and clustered by country. Year 
dummies and country dummy are included and suppressed to save space. Reference year: 2005. Reference country: 
Estonia. 
Source: Authors calculation 
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Table 4: Robustness: Regression Results linear (models and non-linear (log-log) models with CPI (DV: Entry, log) 
 
Variables 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Linear models (log-linear) 
GDP per capita 2nd percentile -0.29 
(0.39) 
-0.13 
(0.38) 
-0.14 
(0.37) 
-0.14 
(0.38) 
-0.16 
(0.37) 
-0.14 
(0.36) 
-0.11 
(0.37) 
GDP per capita 3rd percentile -0.80* 
(0.44) 
-0.80* 
(0.45) 
-0.73** 
(0.36) 
-0.76** 
(0.36) 
-0.79** 
(0.37) 
-0.75** 
(0.37) 
-0.74** 
(0.38) 
GDP per capita 4th percentile -0.30 
(0.34) 
-0.18 
(0.33) 
-0.13 
(0.33) 
-0.14 
(0.34) 
-0.16 
(0.29) 
-0.16 
(0.30) 
-0.11 
(0.35) 
Size of state      
-0.007 
(0.01) 
-0.007 
(0.01) 
Public credit bureau 
0.001 
(0.01) 
0.001 
(0.01) 
0.001 
(0.01) 
-0.001 
(0.01) 
  
-0.002 
(0.01) 
Insolvency cost 
-0.006 
(0.01) 
-0.006 
 (0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
  
-0.01 
(0.01) 
Human capital 
0.04*** 
(0.01) 
0.04*** 
(0.01) 
0.04*** 
(0.01) 
0.04*** 
(0.01) 
0.04*** 
(0.01) 
0.04*** 
(0.01) 
0.04*** 
(0.01 
Corruption (CPI) 
-0.51*** 
(0.09) 
-0.38*** 
(0.10) 
-0.59*** 
(0.12) 
-0.54*** 
(0.12) 
-0.53*** 
(0.12) 
-0.57*** 
(0.13) 
-0.58*** 
(0.12) 
Financial tax policy (tax rate)  
-0.01** 
(0.00) 
-0.05** 
(0.02) 
-0.05** 
(0.02) 
-0.05** 
(0.02) 
-0.05** 
(0.02) 
-0.05** 
(0.02) 
Administrative tax policy (frequency of tax payments)  
0.001 
(0.00) 
 
-0.001 
(0.00) 
0.001 
(0.00) 
0.001 
(0.00) 
0.001 
(0.00) 
Administrative tax policy (time to pay taxes)  
-0.001 
(0.00) 
 
-0.001 
(0.00) 
-0.001 
(0.00) 
-0.001 
(0.00) 
-0.001 
(0.00) 
Corruption (CPI)  x Financial tax policy (tax rate) 
 
 
 
 
0.005** 
(0.00) 
0.005** 
(0.00) 
0.005** 
(0.00) 
0.005** 
(0.00) 
0.005** 
(0.00) 
Constant 
2.66*** 
(0.89) 
2.38*** 
(0.82) 
3.66*** 
(0.96) 
3.51*** 
(0.97) 
3.38** 
(1.02) 
3.89*** 
(1.20) 
4.01*** 
(1.17) 
R2 .51 .55 .55 .56 .56 .56 .56 
RMSE 1.23 1.19 1.18 1.18 1.18 1.18 1.18 
F stat 8.76 8.26 9.74 9.13 9.19 10.14 9.36 
Year & country controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Note: Specifications 5-7 is robustness check taking out the cost of the proceedings recorded as a percentage of the estate’s value (insolvency cost) and public credit bureau. We 
also add control there for the size of state to check the robustness of the disincentive effect of a tax hypothesized in H2Number of obs: 307. Number of countries: 72. Level of 
statistical significance is * 0.10%; ** 0.05%. and *** 0.01%. Standard errors are in parenthesis and are robust for heteroskedasticity and clustered by country. Year dummies and 
country dummies are included and suppressed to save space. Reference year: 2005. Reference country: Estonia. Source: Authors calculation. 
